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Abstract

billion in 2013 [1]. The fast growing e-commerce has
reinforced the online advertising. Among various

Currently, the predominant pricing plan for the

online advertising channels, search engine marketing

search engine (SE) advertising services in a

(SEM), aimed at promoting websites by increasing

proprietary electronic market is a flat fee (FF) pricing.

their visibility in search listings, is mounting rather

These services have faced the challenge of customer

quicker than others [2]. According to the Sixth

attrition recently since FF pricing results in the

Annual State of Search Engine Marketing Report by

inequality of service surplus among subscribers. A

Search Engine Marketing Professional Organization

more sustainable and profitable pricing model would

(SEMPO), the SEM industry in North American is

be to distinguish advertising resources by providing

likely to grow 14%, from $14.6 billion in 2009 to

an additional usage-based pricing for certain user

$16.6 billion by the end of 2010 [3], while this figure

groups to transfer the service surplus among

is projected to only about $4.1 billion in 2003 [4].

subscribers. We conceive a hybrid model integrating

Today, the top three SEM suppliers in the world are

Pay-Per-Click (PPC) pricing into FF pricing. This

Google AdWords, Microsoft adCenter, and Yahoo!

proposed scheme can offer an incentive-compatible

Search Marketing.

mechanism to attract more subscribers by relieving

There are two types of SEM, public SEM and

the inequity of service surplus, and eventually result

internal SEM for proprietary electronic markets. The

in the increasing revenue of service providers.

public SEM is publicly accessible without requesting
a membership (see Table 1), for example, Google

Keywords: search engine marketing; proprietary

AdWords. The public SEM is well accepted and has

search

matured. For example, Google’s total advertising

engine;

flat

fee;

incentive-compatible

mechanism; pricing model; market efficiency

revenues were $21,129 million in 2008 and grew at
8% in 2009 to hit $22,889 million [5]. The internal

1. Introduction
Over the last 30 years, e-commerce has been
booming with the widespread Internet usage.
Forrester predicts that the U.S. e-commerce market
will increase from $176.9 billion in 2010 to $229.1

SEM is the kind of information services available in
a proprietary electronic market and operated by the
market provider mainly for product information
dissemination. The examples can be found in various
forms

of electronic

markets, such as, eBay
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(Consumer-to-Consumer),
(Business-to-Consumer),

and

Amazon

in a SEAM are various search engine (SE)

Alibaba

advertising services. The clients are the suppliers in

(Business-to-Business).

the primary electronic market who are selling their
products. They are potential buyers of the advertising

Table 1. A Comparison between public SEM and

resources. They have two levels of status in the

internal SEM

SEAM: product supplier (everyone has this status),

(Source: Novak and Hoffman 2000 [6])

and subscriber of SE advertising services (service fee

Public SEM

Relationship

Any electronic

A proprietary

to the market

market

electronic market

There is a wide range of pricing models to finance

Incorporating into

SE advertising services, including pay-per-click

Member Services

(PPC), pay-per-action (PPA), pay-per-lead (PPL),

Service

Independence

independency

Internal SEM

payer). The advertising resources are the clicks of the

Aspects

primary market visitors.

Content &

Broad, varied

Structured around

pay-per-purchase (PPP), and so on. Among these

structure

information

products and

pricing models, the PPC model, underpinned by the

types and

services

keyword biding mechanism, is widely adopted in the
public SEAM. The advertiser pays when a user clicks

content
Pay-Per-Click

policy

underpinned by

PPC pricing model is open to abuse by click fraud,

keyword

although rising sophisticated means of detection are

auction

used. In July 2006, Google settled a class-action

Client
Audience

Utility of

Flat Fee (FF)

on its advertisement and visits its site. However, the

Pricing

Any potential

Suppliers in the

advertisers

electronic market

All Internet

Specific target

lawsuit for $90 million fund since plaintiffs
alleging it did not do enough to prevent click fraud
[7]. For another, the advertiser takes the risk of the

users

segments of

conversion rate from a casual click, a visit to an

potential

actual sale in PPC campaign. However, the internal

customers

SEM

High

characteristics (see Table 1).

Low

releases

those

issues

for

its

special

The SE advertising services in a SEAM is an

click
(conversion

important portion in a premium customizable

rate)

package for the subscribers in a proprietary

The ability to

Disability of

Ability of

electronic market. Normally the provider of the

measure the

measuring and

measuring and

market adopts the flat fee (FF) pricing model to

utility of

tracking visits

tracking visits and

finance their services. FF pricing model, the earliest

search engine

and uses of

uses of customers

Web advertising pricing model, is a fixed price for a

advertising

customers

for activities on

given period of time as paid inclusion in a SEAM,

this platform

for example, the annual membership fee. Because FF

Preliminary stage

ignores volumes of the usage/traffic (the amount of

Research

Mature stage

individuals who visit a site), it fails to differentiate

status

SE advertising services for users. This reduces the
Internal SEM has formed a particular advertising
market. We denote this advertising market as search
engine advertising market (SEAM). The public
SEAM denotes the advertising market belonging to
public search engine, such as Google. The products

efficiency of the SEAM.
The motivation that we look into the pricing
problem in the SEAM is triggered by the issue raised
in Alibaba’s B2B market, regarding the efficiency of
the FF pricing model adopted by the company.
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Alibaba Group, started in Hangzhou, China, in 1999,

model and future research works in section 5.

is a leading electronic marketplace assembling
business to business (B2B) international trade, online
retail and payment platforms and data-centric cloud

2. Relevant Background and Research
Work

computing services. Alibaba Group consists of
Alibaba.com (B2B), Taobao.com (C2C), Alipay (a

2.1 Alibaba’s TrustPass program – the Internal

third-party electronic payment service provider),

SE Advertising Services

Alibaba Cloud Computing, and Yahoo! China. By

It is more illustrative that we look into the case of

mid 2010, it has nearly 18,000 employees in more

Alibaba as an example. Alibaba’s TrustPass program,

than 60 cities in China, plus a few other oversea

launched in 2002, includes a paid SE advertising

subsidiaries at the US, Japan, UK, and Singapore [8].

services for suppliers in its B2B electronic market.

Recently, Alibaba B2B has received complaints from

After paying the annual fee, TrustPass subscribers

its e-market subscribers because the number of

have opportunities to be ranked in a good place in a

inquiries or feedbacks some subscribers received did

search engine result list. Figure 1 displays a screen

not bring enough benefit to compensate the cost of

shot with search results in Alibaba’ internal SE. The

annual membership fee. As a result, they may

main difference between an internal SE and a public

unsubscribe from the SEAM after current billing

SE is that the former only provides one set of search

cycle. This raises the issue how to optimize the

results, while the latter delivers a set of organic

allocation of the limited advertising resources among

search results and another set of sponsored search

subscribers. Could an incentive-compatible pricing

results. Products of more competent subscribers

model be incorporated into current pricing scheme,

usually rank top places and hence receive more

such as PPC? What is the impact of this new scheme

inquiries

on current subscribers in the SEAM? These are the

competent subscribers. This situation leads to the

problems that this paper is intended to tackle.

Matthew Effect (the rich get richer and the poor get

from potential

customers

than

less

This paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we

poorer) - the competent subscribers have better

present relevant research background and research

chances to be exposed in the market with more

efforts in this field. We analyze the inefficiency of

opportunities, and hence more budget for advertising.

current FF pricing scheme in the SEAM in section 3.

As a result, those less competent subscribers will

In section 4, we conceive a hybrid pricing model by

unsubscribe TrustPass. This implies the decline of

incorporating PPC pricing into FF pricing, and

revenue for Alibaba. Therefore, improving the

explain the efficiency of the proposed new pricing

market mechanism is critic.

plan. We present the limitation of our proposed

Figure 1： Search Results for Search Term “mobile phone” in Alibaba.com internal SE
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2.2 Relevant Research Efforts

should transform from low fixed-fee penetration

Sen et al summarize five major sources of

pricing in nascent information market to an optimal

revenues for SE as of paid inclusion, paid submission,

pricing mix including usage-based pricing options as

content

these markets mature [15].

promotion,

keyword-linked

banner

advertisements, and paid placement [9]. Paid

In another aspect, some related works discuss the

inclusion is a campaign that guarantees products to

influential factors for revenue maximizing of SEM,

list pages in the main search results. Paid Placement

such as clicks, performance of products and ranks.

is guaranteed a high ranking, usually in relation to

Hoffman and Novak (2000) analyze and compare

desired search keywords with a particular position.

advertising models on the Internet [6]. Chatterjee and

The FF pricing reduces risks and administrative

Hoffman model the commercial “clickstream” at an

costs for service providers, and provides predictable

advertiser supported Web site to predict consumers

fee for advertisers. Referring to the definition by Sen

interacting with advertising stimuli [2]. Weber and

et al, the FF pricing used by the SEAM is for paid

Zheng design

inclusion, but different from the FF scheme for paid

intermediaries and find that profit-maximizing search

placement in Sen et al. However, the FF scheme is

engine design is its rankings considering both

not incentive-compatible, causing the same public

product performance and bid amount [16]. Feng et al

good problem as those services free of charge.

discuss that the performance of several mechanisms

Thus far, the inefficiency of FF pricing in network
services has been well-studied in last fifteen years
(see McKnight and Boroumand 2000, Lin et al 2002)

for allocating sponsored slots depending on the
degree of correlation between suppliers’ willingness

[10] [11]. Novak et al discuss the challenge of FF

Ghose and Yang use a hierarchical Bayesian

pricing that fails to demonstrate to the advertisers the

modeling framework to quantify the relationship

value of their advertising expenditures [6]. Hoffman

between different sponsored search metrics [18].

a two-stage

model

of

search

to pay and their relevance to the search term [17].

and Novak (2002) introduce a CDnow case to present
performance displace the traditional impression

3. The Inefficiency of the Flat Fee
Scheme in Internal SE Advertising

model in Internet advertising marketing [12].

The inefficiency problem in the internal SE

McKnighta and Boroumand discuss the inefficiency

advertising pricing is similar to the problem in a

of FF pricing for internet services and propose new

public good market but with its own specialties. For

the trend that per-click pricing and pay for

service pricing models [10]. Lin et al explore a

example, the annual fee for Alibaba’s TrustPass

virtual private network (VPN) traffic pricing model.

covers other member services except SE advertising

The proposed pricing mechanism can effectively

services. As usual, the FF pricing model results in

promote a VPN's transmission efficiency in the

inequality of service surplus among Alibaba’s

service welfare rate based on their experiment [11].

subscribers. Those better benefited take away others’

Odlyzko

with

and eventually reduce the number of subscribers.

differentiated services in the prices as traffic

Because of limited advertising resources, a SEAM is

management to accommodate user preferences at the

a seller market with limited counts of clicks available

cost of utilization efficiency of the network [13].

in a given time period [19]. In a public SEAM, the

Altmann and Chu discuss the efficiency of purely FF

use of the advertising resources is based on the

pricing and the challenge of per-minute pricing plans

competing price and the market is generally efficient.

in network services, and propose more flexible

We are to use a mathematic model to study the

pricing plans providing access to the Internet via FF

problem of current FF pricing scheme in a SEAM.

discusses

Paris

metro

system

pricing based services and charging for extra demand

Let all advertising resources in a SEAM be A,

based on usage [14]. Sundararaja suggests that firms

which is the total number of clicks in a given time
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period. Denote N as the number of suppliers needing

Where

the internal SE advertising services to promote their

hi – the benefit from other services rather than

businesses. However, only up to M of them, M < N,
will possibly be allocated enough advertising
resources to receive none negative net benefit. They
pay a FF rate r for the service in a given period.
Therefore, the FF revenue R of the SEAM provider is
determined by the number of subscribers and annual
fee, i.e.
R =

internal SE advertising service.
Si – the benefit from internal SE advertising
service.
ci – the conversion rate of the subscriber, which is
determined by the competent level of subscribers.
vi – the number of clicks that the subscriber
receives in a service billing cycle. The competent

M*r

(1)

We call this market clearing status as the primitive

level of subscribers determines their amount of
clicks.

status. Obviously, the primitive status is impossible

If i <0, subscribers will be likely to unsubscribe

because the subscribers of the internal SE advertising

from the SEAM after current billing cycle. The total

service are diversified regarding their competences in

number of subscribers who make non-negative profit

taking advantage of the service after entering the

is M’, which is less than M. From the analysis, the

SEAM by paying a fixed fee. Those having a better

capacity related factor  determines M’. If the

strategy and being more competence may consume

number of subscribers reduces from M to M’, the

more advertising resources with more clicks. This

internal SE advertising provider’s actual revenue

leaves the less competent subscribers less likely to be

becomes

listed in search results since the search result slots are

R’ = M’ * r < R

the scarce resource on search engines.

Figure 2 presents two charts for better illustrating

(3)

Keep M as the maximum number of subscribers

the above models. Without loosing their intuition,

who share the internal SE advertising resources, and

these simplified charts assume that subscribers are

M’ as the actual number of the subscribers who are

identical except their competent levels. We can see

willing to stay in the SEAM. Let  be the competent

that, the ABC is the negative benefit for a certain

level of subscribers in the SEAM. We assume that 

subscribers group, the inequality of click resources

is uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. A subscriber i  {1,

allocation due to competent levels results in only M’

M} has a competent level i . Subscriber i’s decision

< M subscribers have positive surplus of the service.

to maintain his membership is justified by the profit
function:

i = Q(i ) = hi + Si (ci (i ), vi (i )) – r
s.t. i=1M vi  A

(2)

Figure 2: The inequality of the SEAM service reduces the number of subscribers
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4. Hybrid SE Advertising Service Pricing
Figure 2 has hinted us that if we can exploit the positive
surplus from those more competent subscribers to
compensate those having a negative profit, it could make
more subscribers receiving a positive profit from the
SEAM.

A general

approach

for

this

is

the

incentive-compatible mechanism by usage-based pricing
[11]. This idea is not new. For example, the PPC with
keyword auction in current public SEAM is a good case.
The challenge of the SEAM in a proprietary electronic
market is how to adopt the incentive-compatible
mechanism while maintaining the original FF scheme for
other kinds of services besides SEM. In order to deal with
this problem, we conceive a hybrid revenue model by
incorporating a PPC model into the FF model, instead of
completely giving up FF scheme. According to our model,
since the click is directly relevant to the revenue of
subscribers from the SEAM, the SE advertising providers
will charge a fixed price per click from subscribers who
consume extra clicks than a certain threshold. This way
increases the revenue of SE advertising providers by
differentiating advertising resources and investments of
subscribers in the SEAM, meanwhile relieves excess
surplus due to original FF scheme for these more
competent subscribers. At the same time, the SE
advertising provider will compensate a fixed price per
click for subscribers who received lower clicks than a
certain threshold. We expect that the revenue of the
subscribers with low gross benefit exceeds their cost via
compensation. As a result, those may renew the SE

SEAM. The increasing number of subscribers amplifies
the revenue of SE advertising providers.
In fact, although our compensation mechanism is based
on the counts of clicks, the benefit from the clicks in the
SEAM distinguishes among subscribers. There are two
factors determining the utility of each click. One is the
conversion rate from clicks to transactions. Another is the
profit of each transaction for different subscribers. The
conversion rate relies on the competent level of subscribers
to optimize their websites and promote their services for
consumers. The efficiency of each transaction for
subscribers depends on the product performance and
goods traded in one transaction. For example, there are
two subscribers, A and B. For one tranaction, A sells 1000
LV bags and each package worth $1000. B just sells one
bag and the bag worth $100. Thus, A can gain higher profit
from a deal than B. Based on our model, A can gain a
higher profit from each click.
Therefore, although the hybrid pricing scheme can
increase the number of subscribers via compensation
mechanism, it is hard to achieve all M potential
subscribers considering the efficiency of compensation. In
the compensation mechanism relying on the counts of
clicks, some subscribers receive the surplus from the
compensation, and other subscribers might not achieve
enough compensation to make up for their cost so they still
unsubscribe from the SEAM. Similarly, after the SE
advertising provider charges fee from these more
competent subscribers having the same clicks, their service
surplus is different regarding the utilities of clicks.

advertising service in the next period, and remain in the

Figure 3: the benefit of subscribers in the hybrid pricing model
Figure 3 presents a chart to illustrate this intuition.

of subscribers with lower clicks are higher than the

The area AB’C’ is the total compensation from SE

cost, and others are lower than the cost. The

advertising providers. From the illustrative chart, we

wave-like edge of the charge and compensation is

notice, with the compensation, the benefits of a part

due to utilities of clicks for subscribers because the
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same number of clicks may be related to different

revenue increases of PPC and extra subscribers’ fee,

levels of conversion rates or different utilities of

and the loss of revenue due to compensation

transactions.

mechanism simultaneously impact on the total
revenue of the SE advertising provider.

A basic setting for the hybrid scheme:

Figure 4 shows an illustrative chart to present the

Now, the revenue structure of the SE advertising

change of revenue from original FF pricing model to

provider contains three additional portions from

the new hybrid pricing model.

Eq.(3): the revenue from PPC incomes, Rc, the costs

compensation for special subscribers reduces the

for the compensation for the subscribers with low

total revenue, the incremental number of subscribers

clicks, L, and the extra subscribers’ fees from those

promotes the total revenue.

having low clicks but benefited by the new

Though

the

Now, the subscriber j’s profits function of SE

promotion policy, R. The total revenue of internal

advertising service from the hybrid pricing scheme:

SE advertising is

j = Q (j, vL, vH, qL, qH) = hj + Sj (cj(j), vj(j)) – qH

R” = R’ + Rc – L + R

(4)

Let the threshold of charging a high-click fee be vH,
the

threshold

of

paying

back

a

low-click

[(vj – vH) + |vj – vH|] / 2 + qL [(vL – vj) + |vL – vj|] / 2
–r

(8)

s.t. j=1 vj  A
M

compensation be vL, the per-click-based extra charge
for

high-click

subscribers

be

qH,

and

the

per-click-based low-click compensation be qL We

The profits function for the subscribers having a
positive profit in the FF pricing scheme:

j = Q (j, vL, vH, qL, qH) = hi + Sj (cj(j), vj (j)) –

have
Rc = j=1 qH [(vj – vH) + |vj – vH|] / 2

(5)

L = j=1 qL [(vL – vj) + |vL – vj|] / 2

(6)

R = (M” – M’) * r

(7)

N

N

where M” > M’ is the number of subscribers who
have non-negative profit from the new mechanism. It

qH [(vj – vH ) + |vj – vH|] / 2 – r

(8)’

The profits function for the subscribers having a
negative profit in the FF pricing scheme:

j = Q (j, vL, vH, qL, qH) = hj + Sj (cj(j), vj(j)) +
qL [(vL – vj ) + |vL – vj|] / 2 – r

(8)”

is obvious we must set vH  vL.
The above indicates that the SE advertising

Since the number of clicks is observable in the

provider needs to deal with the tradeoff between the

SEAM, properly choosing vH, and qH can always

revenue of PPC campaign, Rc, extra subscribers fees,

maintain a positive profit level for those affected

R, and the compensation, L. Although the

subscribers. Hence an SE advertising provider will

compensation seizes a part of total revenue from the

have a positive Rc to fund L for the compensation

SE

compensation

expenses. Similarly, properly choosing vL, and qL can

mechanism expands the number of subscribers

always help those low-click subscribers to earn a

compared with original FF pricing model. In return,

positive profit. This will eventually result in a

the increasing number of subscribers amplifies the

positive R. In this way, the hybrid pricing scheme is

revenue of the extra subscribers’ fees. The direct

superior to the FF pricing scheme.

advertising

provider,

the

Figure 4: the comparison of the total revenue between the hybrid pricing model and the FF scheme
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5. Conclusion
This paper investigates the effect of pricing schemes for
the SE advertising service in the proprietary SEAM. The

retrieved on August 1, 2010, from
http://www.sempo.org/news/03-25-10
[4] The State of Search Engine Marketing 2004.

FF scheme fails to differ services in the SEAM and results

SEMPO December 2004, retrieved on July 31, 2010,

in inequality of service surplus among subscribers. This

from

eventually reduces the number of subscribers. The

http://www.sempo.org/learning_center/research/sem

proposed hybrid SE service pricing scheme incorporates

po_trends/

the PPC pricing model into the FF pricing scheme. It
provides certain incentive-compatible mechanism to attract
more subscribers to the SE advertising service in the

[5] 2010 Financial Tables - Google Investor Relations,
retrieved on August 1, 2010, from
http://investor.google.com/financial/tables.html
[6] Novak, T.P. and D.L. Hoffman, Advertising and

SEAM.
As an analytical model, the hybrid model has its

Pricing Models for the World Wide Web, Internet

limitation. We treat the efficiency of each click of different

Publishing and Beyond: The Economics of Digital

subscribers without distinction. Thus, the proposed

Information and Intellectual Property, Cambridge:

incentive-compatible mechanism might not encourage all

MIT Press, 2000.

of the subscribers in the SEAM.
Several avenues present for future research. First, we

[7] Goldman E., Click Fraud, 20th Annual Technology
and Computer Law Conference, May 24-25, 2007

may distinguish the efficiency of clicks for different

Texas Austin, retrieved on July 31, 2010, from

subscribers, including conversion rate and the utilities of

http://www.ericgoldman.org/Resources/clickfraudbl

different transactions. If so, the proposed model would be

ogposts.pdf

better to encourage the subscribers in the SEAM through

[8] Alibaba Group, Company Overview, retrieved on

avoiding under-compensation and overcompensation.

July 12, 2010, from

Second, we will analyze the implementation of the hybrid

http://news.alibaba.com/specials/aboutalibaba/aligro

pricing strategies for the SEAM via computational

up/index.html

stimulations after completing the relevant math model.

[9] Sen R., James D. Hess, S. Bandyopadhyay, and J.

Laboratory experiments will determine the concrete

Jaisingh, PRICING PAID PLACEMENTS ON

strategies of SE compensation and PPC pricing for

SEARCH ENGINES, Journal of Electronic

subscribers in the proposed model. Laboratory will find the

Commerce Research, VOL 9, NO1, 2008.

optimized situation in the hybrid pricing model for revenue
of the SEAM.

[10] McKnight L.W., and J. Boroumand, Pricing Internet
services: after flat rate, Telecommunications Policy,
Volume 24, Issues 6-7, August 2000, Pages 565-590.
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